To borrow from Shakespeare, to pay, or not to pay, that is the question. At the ISACA® North America Conference in Orlando (Florida, USA) in May 2025, hundreds of IT/IS professionals gathered at the main stage at the Lowe's Sapphire Falls Resort, where ISACA held its first debate-style keynote. The debate on ransomware was between esteemed cyberprofessionals Ira Winkler and Richard Hollis, and was moderated by author Jeremy Treadwell.
Not only are threat actors becoming more aggressive in collecting data, they are also discovering additional revenue streams and increasing risk exposure for the organization.In preparation for the debate, the author. developed four unique scenarios to discuss the ethics, feasibility, probability, and criticality of ransomware incidents that challenge human decision making. The audience was first polled based solely on the scenario presented, followed by the panelists passionately arguing the pros and cons of paying the ransom in the hypothetical scenario. After supporting arguments were made, the audience voted again to indicate whether their minds were changed during the debate.
Setting the Stage
Prior to the debate, the audience was briefed on ransomware and extortionware, which can be detrimental to enterprises on a global scale. In 2024, Sophos reported that, of those surveyed, 32% of attacks started with an unpatched vulnerability.1 Extortionware leverages encryption technology intended for legitimate security purposes by way of decryption keys that become the only way to access affected files.
Unlike basic ransomware that only encrypts data, extortionware involves:
- Data exfiltration—Threat actors steal sensitive information before encryption.
- Double extortion—Criminals demand payment not only to decrypt data but also to prevent public release of stolen information.
- Multiple leverage points—Even if victims can recover from backups, they remain vulnerable to data exposure threats.
One reputable cybersecurity report indicates that extortionware attacks predominantly concentrate on sectors handling sensitive or high-value information, including healthcare, finance, and education.2 This strategy provides attackers with increased leverage, compelling victims to consider both operational recovery and the potential risk of data exposure.
What this means is that not only are threat actors becoming more aggressive in collecting data, they are also discovering additional revenue streams and increasing risk exposure for the organization—which is arguably why ransoms are paid.
With that context in mind, the audience was presented with four distinct ransomware scenarios. Each was designed to push beyond the technical and into the psychological, surfacing how human judgment, fear, and bias collide with cybersecurity policy and risk management.
The Hostage Hospital Hack: When Ethics Collide with Law
In the first scenario, a cybergang has encrypted a major hospital's patient records, demanding US$5 million in Bitcoin to restore access. With surgeries delayed and a new European law prohibiting ransom payments, the hospital's board faces an impossible choice. Before the debate, 280 attendees cast their votes: 145 supported paying the ransom, 135 were against.
Without evidence, payment may only fuel baseless threats. In cybersecurity, data-driven skepticism often wins out over speculative fear.Winkler framed his argument through the lens of patient care: “You can rebuild data, but you can't undo harm to a patient.” He emphasized the human cost of delays, reminding the audience that time lost in healthcare is measured in lives, not revenue. His position leaned into the ethical obligations that healthcare leaders face, even when law and policy dictate otherwise. Hollis countered sharply with the legal realities: “Paying invites more attacks. Laws exist to force resilience, not create shortcuts.” He focused on the broader security implications, arguing that capitulation undermines systemic progress. The debate highlighted the tension between immediate moral responsibility and long-term public good.
After the debate, 8% reconsidered their stance and switched to paying. While both positions held weight, Winkler’s ethical focus on saving lives clearly resonated with the audience, shifting opinions and outweighing concerns about policy or precedent.
The Billionaire's Dilemma: When Reputation Meets Risk
The second scenario involves a hedge fund managing billions in client assets. The fund is hit by ransomware, freezing all transactions. The attackers claim they will delete the data forever if they are not paid. Still, a recent US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warning states that this particular group has never actually honored a ransom deal, leaving the chief executive officer (CEO) to gamble on whether paying will resolve the issue or simply fund the next attack.
Initial polling showed just 17% of the audience supported paying the ransom.
Hollis pressed the fiduciary responsibility angle: "Sometimes the cost of inaction is far greater than the ransom itself.” He emphasized the enormous financial impact of frozen assets and how quickly client confidence could erode. Hollis positioned the ransom as a necessary evil to protect continuity and avoid a far costlier fallout down the line. Winkler countered with the harsh truth from the FBI: “These attackers don’t honor deals. Why fund the next attack?" He leaned into industry evidence and repeated patterns of exploitation, arguing that paying does not solve the root issue but often invites further targeting.
This debate highlighted a philosophical divide between those who prioritize immediate operational continuity and those who prioritize long-term organizational resilience and security discipline. Winkler’s point was clear: Once trust is broken, further transactions are a gamble, and fear-driven decisions rarely end well in cybersecurity.
Post-debate, less than 7% shifted positions. Winkler’s grounded logic seemed to carry more weight, reminding attendees that skepticism is a hallmark of cybersecurity for good reason. Hollis’s fiduciary argument was unable to override the collective wisdom that betting on a dishonest adversary is poor risk management.
The Small-Town Shutdown: Community vs. Criminals
In the third scenario, the mayor of a small town has confirmed the city's water treatment systems are locked by ransomware, halting operations. With no IT team on staff, and the attackers demanding a modest US$50,000 in crypto, the city council will vote on whether to pay using emergency funds or wait for state-level intervention, while residents remain without clean water.
The initial vote: 58% of the audience was in favor of paying, 42% were against.
Winkler emphasized urgency: "Quick action restores public trust." He leaned into the real-world consequences of operational downtime, underscoring how delays erode confidence and escalate community frustration. Hollis urged caution, pointing out: "Small ransoms today fuel bigger asks tomorrow. One payment becomes precedent." He anchored his position in the broader trend of escalating criminal demands and the precedent it sets. The debate revealed not just a difference in risk appetite but a divergence in worldview: one prioritized immediate relief and public trust, while the other focused on long-term security posture and governance expectations. Both arguments carried weight, but the tension between practical necessity and strategic principle framed this as one of the more relatable and contentious scenarios of the day.
After the debate, 14% shifted to not paying—the highest swing of the session. Hollis’s steady argument about precedent and escalating demands resonated. While the emotional instinct was to resolve the crisis quickly, attendees recognized that resilience sometimes requires discomfort.
The Fakeout at FuturaTech: Bluff, Blunder, or Best Guess?
Scenario four introduces FuturaTech, a fast-scaling artificial intelligence (AI) startup that has received an email claiming its intellectual property was stolen and will be released unless a US$2 million ransom is paid. But after internal checks show no breach or signs of compromise, the leadership team is split: Treat it like a bluff and ignore it, or preemptively pay to avoid reputational ruin before next week’s investor pitch? Then, a confidential product slide deck leaks online the next day.
Across all of these scenarios, fear of loss, urgency to act, and uncertainty of the adversary’s credibility emerged as the dominant psychological drivers shaping decisions.Initial polling showed that 18% of the audience supported paying, while 82% were against.
Hollis argued that preemptively paying could protect valuation and reputation ahead of an investor pitch. He leaned into the pressure founders face in protecting their enterprise’s image during high-stakes moments, suggesting that mitigating risk—real or perceived—was worth the price. Hollis stood firm: “Fear isn’t a strategy. Validate before you pay.” He emphasized the need for evidence, underscoring that succumbing to vague threats only encourages future attacks. The debate revealed two distinct leadership mindsets—one driven by immediate optics and reputation management, the other by resilience, verification, and long-term consequences. Facts must lead decisions, not fear of embarrassment.
After the debate, only 3% changed. Winkler’s rationale struck home: Without evidence, payment may only fuel baseless threats. In cybersecurity, data-driven skepticism often wins out over speculative fear.
The Psychology Behind the Scenarios
Academic research on decision making under pressure—particularly the Prospect Theory3—helps explain why organizations often feel compelled to pay. Under the psychological weight of operational, financial, and reputational loss, people tend to make riskier decisions when facing certain harm, even if logic and law suggest otherwise. The debate illuminated that reality numerous times.
Research by Dr. Shayla Treadwell exploring leadership during critical incidents in the cybersecurity domain emphasizes how leaders draw on their lived experiences, adaptive reasoning, and understanding of organizational risk when navigating moments of crisis.4 Treadwell’s work supports the notion that decisions made under duress are rarely isolated from personal or institutional history, and often hinge on the leader’s capacity to manage uncertainty and trust their preparation.
In the case of the hospital hack, the ethical weight of patient safety put immediate action front and center, illustrating how human life can override legal considerations in the heat of crisis. For the hedge fund, skepticism rooted in data and experience underscored how reputation and trust are guarded fiercely but not impulsively. The small-town shutdown revealed the pressure leaders feel from community expectations and the desire for quick resolutions, even as long-term resilience strategies beckon. Finally, the FuturaTech scenario highlighted how the absence of hard evidence tempers reactionary thinking, even when reputation and capital are on the line.
Across all of these scenarios, fear of loss, urgency to act, and uncertainty of the adversary’s credibility emerged as the dominant psychological drivers shaping decisions. These are not hypothetical academic theories—they are the messy realities leaders navigate in real-world ransomware incidents.
Conclusion
The debate made it crystal clear that ransomware decisions are rarely purely moral, technical, or legal—they are psychological. Between the fear of public fallout, the urgency of human safety, or the uncertainty of an unknown adversary’s credibility, decision makers are navigating more than a checklist. They are navigating human bias under extreme pressure.
The passionate debate brought to life the reality of how decisions are made in real-world scenarios. These conversations revealed the complexities, trade-offs, and very human instincts that shape cybersecurity leadership when faced with uncertainty, conflicting pressures, and imperfect information—gray areas no policy or playbook can fully resolve.
Clearly, cybersecurity leaders and governance bodies have a lot to gain by building human decision making under crisis into playbooks and tabletop exercises, and incorporating cross-disciplinary training. In doing so, organizations will be better equipped to respond consistently, ethically, and with a clear understanding of the risk landscape.
Endnotes
1 Adam, S.; “Unpatched Vulnerabilities: The Most Brutal Ransomware Attack Vector,” Sophos, 3 April 2024
2 Jareth; “How to Limit Your Personal Data Exposure When a Company is Hit With Ransomware,” Emsisoft, 21 September 2021
3 Kahneman, D.; Amos, T.; “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica, vol. 47, iss. 2, 1979, p. 263–91
4 Treadwell, S. R.; Using Critical Incidents to Explore the Lived Experiences of Information Security Executives, ProQuest, 2021
JEREMY TREADWELL
Is a leader in technology and innovation with a track record of driving transformation for Fortune 500 and 1000 companies across industries such as energy, healthcare, and technology. A certified futurist, solutions architect, and co-founder of SIMCIA Security, Treadwell develops human-centered, AI-powered solutions to foster security-first cultures and behavior change within organizations.